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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND
REGULATORY REFORM
Douglas M. Costle*
As the first year of the Reagan Administration drew to a close, it was
increasingly evident that the "regulatory relief" undertaken by the Presi-
dent and his appointees is not the genuine regulatory reform hoped for by
both the public and the regulated industry. "Regulatory relief," a slogan
that springs from a philosophical opposition to using government to solve
social and economic problems, signals an intent to regulate less-not
necessarily better. For those committed to "regulatory relief," how to
regulate better is not the issue.
The pace of regulatory activity has markedly slowed. In the field of
regulation under the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as only
one example, important regulations required by statute and desired by the
public either have been long delayed or, after taking effect, have been
halted or rolled back: hazardous waste land disposal rules, I the Superfund
National Contingency Plan for the cleanup of the nation's worst hazar-
dous waste sites, 2 the Clean Air Act ban on new source construction in
nonattainment areas, 3 the annual reporting requirement for hazardous
* Former Administrator, United States Environmental Protection Agency; Chairman, 1979-
1981, United States Regulatory Council; Of Counsel, Updike, Kelly & Spellacy, Hartford, Conn.;
Of Counsel, Wald, Harkrader & Ross, Washington, D.C.; B.A., 1961, Harvard University; J.D.,
1964, University of Chicago. The author is currently serving as Chairman of the Executive Commit-
tee of the Environmental Testing and Certification Corporation, Edison, N.J. The author wishes to
thank Ann Adams Webster, Associate, Wald, Harkrader & Ross, Washington, D.C., for her assis-
tance in preparing this article.
1. Hazardous waste land disposal regulations have been the subject of considerable litigation.
The EPA proposed permanent regulations for land disposal on February 5, 1981. 46 Fed. Reg.
11,126 (1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 260, 264). Subsequently, however, the Agency
issued a notice stating that it was reexamining its approach to regulating such facilities and soliciting
comments on an appropriate regulatory framework. 46 Fed. Reg. 28,314 (1981). The District Court
for the District of Columbia ordered the EPA to promulgate final regulations by February 1, 1982, but
that deadline was stayed pending appeal. Illinois v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 340 (D.D.C. 1981). The
regulations were finally issued on July 26, 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 32,274 (1982).
2. The revision of the National Contingency Plan, required as part of title I of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9615
(West Supp. 1981), was to have been issued by June 9, 1981. See id. § 9605. However, the EPA
missed this deadline and was placed under court order to publish a proposed plan by March 15, 1982,
and the final plan by May 15, 1982. Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, Nos. 81-2083 and 81-
2269 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1982). The EPA met the first of these deadlines. See 47 Fed. Reg. 10,972 (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed Mar. 12, 1982). The deadline for issuance of the final
plan was subsequently extended to July 16, Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, Nos. 81-2083
and 81-2269 (D.D.C. May 28, 1982), and was met by the EPA. 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180 (1982).
3. On August 7, 1980, the EPA announced that states would have until May.7, 1981, to submit
revised state implementation plans (SIP's) for nonattainment areas, and that if a state failed to meet
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waste facilities, 4 regulations requiring inspections for asbestos in schools
and providing aid for asbestos removal from schools, 5 and several auto-
mobile and truck emission standards. 6 These are just a few examples of
"regulatory relief." The Administration claims as an accomplishment the
mere quantitative decrease in rules promulgated by the government dur-
ing 1981, as compared with 1980. 7
Regulatory relief is a fundamentally wrong-headed approach to solving
the problems that many people legitimately perceived by the late 1970's
as overlapping, duplicative, and often simply nonsensical regulation.
True regulatory reform would eliminate those absurdities, to be sure, but
it would take as its primary goal better, not necessarily less, regulation.
Instead of the uncertain, on-again/off-again regulatory climate that is cre-
ated by regulatory relief and which is very costly to businesses, which
must proceed with their own activities in any event, regulatory reform
should proceed in an innovative risk-taking spirit to devise fair, reason-
able, and effective regulations that will encourage compliance.
Regulatory reform should be premised on recognition that government
regulation is both necessary and inevitable in our complex, technology-
based economy. Indeed, regulation can even be profitable to industry if
structured to stimulate productivity and innovation.
A central theme of "regulatory relief" seems to be a return to reliance
on the marketplace to achieve social goals. Though this may be the right
approach in certain areas of economic regulation, it is misplaced in the
case of environmental, health, and safety regulation. It is precisely be-
cause the marketplace has not worked to protect the public in the past in
these areas that successive Congresses, with significant bipartisan majori-
ties, have legislated this form of regulation. Because air and water have
historically been treated as "free" goods, the cost of pollution arising
this deadline, a construction ban would go into effect on November 7. 1981. 45 Fed. Reg. 52.676.
52,687 (1980). The EPA has now reversed this position, and instead of imposing an automatic con-
struction ban, has announced it will review each SIP individually. 46 Fed. Reg. 62,651 (1981). But
even this review will not begin until settlement negotiations in litigation challenging the August 7
regulations are complete. Id.
4. See 47 Fed. Reg. 7841 (1982) (delaying effective date of the reporting requirement until Au-
gust 1, 1982).
5. The EPA proposed this rule on September 17, 1980.45 Fed. Reg. 61,966 (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 763). It is still pending.
6. The EPA recently proposed that the percentage of gasoline-fueled land diesel heavy-duty en-
gines and light-duty trucks that will be allowed not to meet the emission standard be raised from 10%
to 40%. 47 Fed. Reg. 1642 (1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86) (proposed Jan. 13. 1982).
7. The Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief estimated a decrease of about 25% in the
number of rules promulgated in the first 10 months of the Reagan Administration, compared to the
same period in 1980. The Vice President, Office of the Press Secretary, Year-End Summary of the
Administration's Regulatory Relief Program (Dec. 30, 1981) (on file with the Washington Law Re-
view).
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from producing things for the market had rarely been "internalized" in
the cost of production-a classic case of market failure.
Although the marketplace alone cannot act as an effective self-regula-
tor of the environment or in other areas of public health and safety, a
successful program of regulatory reform-as opposed to regulatory re-
lief-would use marketplace incentives more imaginatively to achieve
the desired results. Such an approach is, however, fundamentally differ-
ent from what seems to be happening now. True regulatory reform would
work, through government regulation, to restructure the incentives that
govern choices in the marketplace to ensure that the choices made by
companies and individuals will protect rather than degrade the environ- -
ment and human health.
Regulatory relief asks the wrong question when it asks whether a regu-
lation's benefits justify its costs. True regulatory reform asks how to
make regulation fair, reasonable, and effective-that is, both efficient in
spending social resources and successful in achieving compliance. In-
stead of simply devising new procedural burdens to impede the regulator,
we ought to focus our regulatory reform efforts on finding effective ways
to regulate by stimulating and rewarding industry's efficient compliance
with regulation.
I. THE CASE FOR REGULATION
A. The Political Basis ofRegulation
Under our constitutional system, the regulator starts where Congress
leaves off: with delegated authority to make rules, often including the
authority to determine whether there is a need for a rule in the first place;
to inspect for violations; to determine whether violation has or has not
occurred; and to proceed against alleged violators of the rules. 8
No matter how attenuated statutory delegations of regulatory authority
sometimes are, in each instance Congress has at least identified the social
good to be pursued by the agency charged with implementing the act. The
purposes of the Clean Air Act, 9 for example, include protection and en-
hancement of the quality of the nation's air resources in order to promote
the public health and welfare, productivity, and economic growth consis-
tent with preserving clean air. 10 The purposes of the Resource Conserva-
8. W. GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINISTATIVE LAW 54, 57 (6th ed. 1974); see e.g., Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921, 6927, 6928, 6982 (1976).
9. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401(b), 7470 (West Supp. 1981).
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tion and Recovery Act, 1 another example, include regulation of the treat-
ment, storage, transportation, and disposal of discarded materials that
have or may have adverse effects on human health or the environment, as
may be necessary to protect human health or the environment. 12
Thus a statutory mandate to regulate springs from a political determina-
tion that, in economic terms, certain goods not being produced by the free
play of market forces ought to be produced anyway, even though govem-
ment must produce them. True regulatory reform will not proceed absent
recognition of this underlying reality-that Congress requires regulation
because it perceives something to be gained which the market, by itself,
does not produce. Though this seems a rather basic premise, it bears
repeating because many in government today would ignore it in their
quest for the holy grail of "regulatory relief."
The motivations behind prior political determinations to seek the bene-
fits of regulation are easily ignored today because many of the benefits
realized from a particular regulatory program are not quantifiable. The
legislative process that culminates in, for example, an environmental stat-
ute is typically animated by a widely shared fear of the harms that may
result if regulation is not undertaken. The benefits of such regulation be-
gin with the substantial "negative benefit" of preventing or mitigating
the enormous harms that would occur without regulation.
Despite this difficulty of quantifying anticipated regulatory benefits, re-
cent opinion polls have consistently shown that substantial majorities' 3 of
the public oppose any relaxation of environmental regulation. Pollster
Louis Harris recently stated, in testimony before the House subcommittee
considering amendments to the Clean Air Act: "[T]his message o[f] the
deep desire on the part of the American people to battle pollution is one of
the most overwhelming and clearest we have ever recorded in our twenty-
five years of surveying public opinion [in this country]." 14
11. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6902(4), 6903(5), (27), 6922-6924 (1976).
13. "[L]opsided," in pollster Louis Harris' own words. Clean Air Act, 1981: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (statement of Louis Harris).
14. ld., see also 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 789 (Oct. 23, 1981). The Harris Survey, Substantial
Majorities Indicate Support for Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, June I1, 1981. shows that of a
national representative sample, 40% of the respondents believed that air pollution standards are "not
protective enough" (and 38% said they are "just about right," with only 18% stating that they are
"overly protective"); 48% of the respondents believed that water pollution standards are "not pro-
tective enough" (and 43% said they are "just about right," with only 6% stating that they are
"overly protective").
The September 1981 Harris survey on which the testimony referred to above was based indicated
that 80% of the sample opposed relaxing existing federal air pollution regulations, and only 17%
favored such relaxation.
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B. Modern Regulation and the Quantification of Benefits
Regulation by the federal government is not new. It began at least as
early as 1838, when Congress provided for the licensing of steamship
operators. 15 Over the next decades such "traditional" regulatory agen-
cies as the Interstate Commerce Commission, 16 the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 17 and the Federal Communications Commission 18
were established to provide relatively tangible economic benefits in return
for relatively tangible economic costs. New restrictions on companies
that wanted to sell stock to the public or occupy a portion of the radio
spectrum, for example, yielded clear economic benefits by preventing se-
curities fraud and by allocating scarce spectrum space so that clear broad-
casting signals would be provided. This was economic regulation. Its
costs and benefits could be fairly easily compared because both could be
weighed on the same scale. The decision whether and how to proceed
with regulation was relatively straightforward.
By contrast, the new forms of regulation that rapidly developed in the
1970's, especially in environmental protection, worker safety, and con-
sumer health and saf6ty, provide benefits that we have only begun to learn
how to measure. While the costs to industry of compliance with such reg-
ulation usually enter our wage- and price-setting processes-that is, they
are passed on to consumers 9-the benefits often do not. Householders
purchase electric power at a higher cost than they would but for air quality
regulation, but the benefits they receive in the form of cleaner air are not
easily quantifiable in terms of dollars and cents. Yet these new kinds of
regulation are government's response to citizens' demands for control
over the environmental and health effects of our industrial economy.
These effects are especially evident in the postwar chemical revolution.
Until approximately 1940, the pace of chemical development was rela-
tively slow. Most chemicals in common use were derived from naturally
A November 1981 survey conducted for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce indicated, according to
the president of Opinion Research, which conducted the survey, that the public would support
procedural or administrative changes to the Clean Air Act, but none that would affect air quality. For
example, even when respondents were informed that air pollution control from 1970 to 1987 could
cost over $400 billion, 29% said more money should be spent, 34% said the costs are about right, and
only 28% said the costs should be less. 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 973 (Dec. 11, 198 1).
15. Act ofJuly 7, 1838, ch. 191,5Stat. 304.
16. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383 (1887) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 11 (1976)).
17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 881, 885 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1976)).
18. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976)).
19. Regulatory Reform, 1979: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 56 (1979) (prepared statement of John P. Schultze).
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occurring materials-principally minerals and plants. They had been
"screened" by the physical and historical environment: over three mil-
lion years, human beings had learned by trial and error which chemicals
were edible, useful, or dangerous.
Since World War II, however, the chemical industry has developed
thousands of entirely new synthetic substances. They are on the market
because of their benefits to medicine, agriculture, and industry. But many
also have side-effects we did not anticipate and could not judge ade-
quately for years: thalidomide, DES, and DDT, for example. Unlike their
predecessors, these chemicals had not been subjected to the evolutionary
testing of the environment and human experience. Compounding the
problem posed by the novelty of these chemicals was the rate at which
they entered the market. As recently as 1971, approximately two million
synthetic and natural compounds were known. A decade later, five mil-
lion were known; 45,000 were in commercial distribution (not counting
several thousand pesticides). The complexity of determining cause-and-
effect relationships between these substances and the plethora of harms to
which human health and the environment are exposed is immense. To
determine whether a single chemical causes cancer, for example, may
require a team of pathologists, 300 mice, two to three years, and approxi-
mately $500,000 (and despite this expenditure of resources, the chemi-
cal's neurological, genetic, and reproductive capability effects would re-
main largely unknown).
The nature and pace of such technological change-the bulk of which
our society neither can nor desires to reverse-has made environmental,
health, and safety regulation necessary and inevitable. While much of the
rhetoric of regulatory reform blames excessive and cumbersome regula-
tion on "big government" or on bureaucrats who are ignorant of eco-
nomic realities, the truth is that a "big society" and our industrial suc-
cess-spurred, above all, by technological change-have generated
problems that no one in government or industry could have anticipated.
No one predicted in 1950 that sulfur and nitrogen oxides created in one
region might travel to another region as acid rain, slowing forest growth,
impoverishing soil, and killing lakes. Nor could anyone have predicted in
1950 that millions of people spraying aerosol cans each day might erode
the ozone shield. Government has not manufactured such problems to
justify regulation, any more than industry has deliberately set out to cre-
ate them.
Despite constant imperfections and some excesses, and despite signifi-
cant scientific ambiguity about cause-and-effect relationships, much re-
cent regulation represents a necessarily hasty effort to improvise protec-
tion against novel and often unpredictable forces. As such, it is
414
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necessarily subject to error, which must be weeded out. Regulation is also
subject to change, of course, as the forces that spawn environmental,
health, and safety problems change. Regulatory reformers must con-
stantly go back, take a fresh look at old regulation, and revise or eliminate
it. But the fact remains that regulation-undertaken as much to prevent
substantial harm to society in the future as to remedy existing situations
that have gotten out of hand-will always be necessary.
II. ASSESSING THE COST OF REGULATION
A. Generally
While the process of identifying and quantifying the benefits of pro-
posed regulations continues, both industry and government have tended
to over-estimate the costs of such regulation.2 0 Much of our industrial
trouble since 1970 has been blamed on environmentaLregulation, despite
statistical analyses that have proven that such regulation currently con-
tributes only about one-tenth of one percent to annual inflation and that it
reduces unemployment rather than adds to it.21
The electric utility industry's use of coal is one example. Some have
argued that environmental regulation prevents our use of coal. In the last
two years of the Carter Administration, however, the EPA approved the
construction of eighty-seven new coal-fired utility boilers located all
around the country-two within eighteen miles of a Class I area. When
built, these power plants will represent roughly a twenty percent increase
in coal use by utilities. Overall, national coal consumption has increased
by an estimated 16.5% since 1978.22 Thus, environmental regulation has
not prevented conversion to coal from other fuels.
The steel industry is another example. Between 1971 and 1978, the
American steel industry invested $3.1 billion in pollution-control equip-
20. At the EPA under the Carter Administration, there was ample opportunity to cultivate skepti-
cism about cost estimates. EPA analyses comparing cost estimates (by both industry and the EPA) for
controlling pollution with the actual pollution-control costs that emerged some years later showed
that both the EPA and industry had tended to overestimate compliance costs. For example, both the
EPA and industry estimated that pollution control would cost the petroleum refining industry $1.4
billion for the years 1974 through 1977; the actual cost was between $550 million and $750 million.
The EPA estimated that iron and steel plants would have to spend $830 million during those three
years for pollution control and industry estimated $1.6 billion; actual figures ranged between $470
and $630 million, roughly half to three-quarters of the EPA's prediction and about one-third of indus-
try's. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1980: THE ELEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 396, 398 (Dec. 1980).
21. Data Resources, Inc., The Macroeconomic Impact of Federal Pollution Control Programs-
1981 Assessment (July 17, 198 1) (study submitted to EPA).
22. U.S. DEFT. OF ENERGY, ENERGY DATA REPORT, WEEKLY COAL REPORT No. 225 (Jan. 22,
1982).
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ment. 23 To be sure, this is a substantial sum which could have contributed
toward significant improvements in productivity if devoted exclusively to
modernizing plant and eqpipment. In the same period of time, however,
Japanese steelmakers spent $3.7 billion-$600 million more than Ameri-
can counterparts-on pollution control and, in addition, outspent us on
new machinery and expanded capacity. 24 Further, Japanese emission
standards on steel plants are apparently tougher than are ours. 25
This is not meant to deprecate the financial effect of environmental reg-
ulation on industry. Though the cost of pollution controls mandated by
the federal government represented only about 3.3% of GNP and about
3. 1 % of all spending by industry on plant and equipment in 1981,26 the
effects on specific industries can be substantial. Utilities, for instance,
have to devote about 10% of capital investment to pollution control; the
steel industry, about 20%.27 This is not surprising when one considers
that these are inherently "dirty" industries that are responsible for a pro-
portionately large fraction of the total air pollution problem. Given that
the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts set time limits for achieving their
goals, 28 the "dirtiest" industries, in effect, have the biggest and most
expensive jobs to do. Therefore their environmental expenditures can be
expected to represent a substantially larger percentage of their total capi-
tal expenditures for the affected time period than is true for other indus-
tries.
But we run a greater danger of exaggerating the dollar cost of environ-
mental regulation than of underestimating it. The danger is that, by as-
suming that broad-scale deregulation will cure most industrial maladies,
we risk postponing our analysis of deeper-rooted economic problems, and
thus give our competition more time to extend its lead. The fact is that
most estimates of regulatory costs do not include any reckoning of finan-
cial benefits in terms of sickness prevented, worker absenteeism avoided,
and serious environmental damage that would have occurred without reg-
23. Meyerson, Japan: Environmentalism with Growth, Wall St. J., Sept. 5. 1980, at 14. col. 4.
24. Id.
25. On this point, the Wall Street Journal-no friend of the EPA-had this to say: "American
businessmen often complain that the severity of environmental regulation puts U.S. industry at inter-
national competitive disadvantage. Yet for the last ten years. Japanese environmental policy has been
at least as strict and sometimes more expensive than our own. . . . Japanese industry has been so
resourceful that it has been able to grow in spite of those costs." Id.
26. Data Resources, Inc., The Macroeconomic Impact of Federal Pollution Control Programs-
1981 Assessment (July 17, 1981) (study submitted to EPA): see also G.L. Rutledge and B.D.
O'Connor. Plant and Equipment Expenditures by Business for Pollution Abatement, 1973-1980,
and Planned 1981, 61 U.S. DEPT. OF COM., BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, SURV. OF CURRENT Bus.
No. 6, 19, 21 (June 4, 1981) (tables showing new equipment expenditures for pollution abatement by
U.S. nonfarm business).
27. Id.
28. E.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b) (West 1978),.42 U.S.C.A. §§7407-10(WestSupp.1981).
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ulation. Our social accounting tends to commemorate the visible victo-
ries, not the invisible ones. Just as there are no statues to honor generals
who kept the peace, so there are no dollar figures to measure harms that
never happened.
The difficulties of attempting to quantify accurately the benefits and
costs of regulation are not new. Even regulators who have favored cost-
benefit analysis have generally acknowledged these difficulties, 29 but
have pursued the effort in an open-minded way. They have tried to help
focus more clearly the regulatory options in terms of respective costs and
benefits that could be quantified, with the understanding that not all rele-
vant considerations can be rendered in dollars-and-cents terms. Regula-
tory analysis fares better when it concentrates on developing cost-effec-
tive regulation-that which achieves a regulatory goal at the least cost-
and on forcing an honest appraisal of both regulatory and non-regulatory
alternatives, than when it attempts to force data into preconceived, rigid,
methodological models of strict cost-benefit analysis.
B. The Methodology of "Regulatory Relief"
Under President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291,30 the emphasis in
the use of cost-benefit analysis has decidedly shifted from using cost-ben-
efit concepts as an analytical tool to make regulation better to requiring
cost-benefit analysis to justify a particular regulation, and thus to regulate
less. One premise of the Executive Order, and other "regulatory relief"
activities, is that the regulatory policy-making process can and should ap-
proximate the marketplace. Another premise is that the costs of regulation
tend to'outweigh its benefits. The current policy, therefore, is to slow or
halt regulatory activity by imposing new burdens on the regulators. This
approach utterly ignores both our experience of the last twenty-five years
and the rationale for government intervention and regulation in the first
place: the marketplace simply fails to provide the environmental, health,
and safety benefits that are necessary to enable our society and economy
to continue at even current levels of well-being. This policy motivation
29. For a discussion of the difficulties of estimating costs, see note 20 supra. Susceptible as they
are to error, estimating benefits is even more difficult. First, there are all the problems of establishing
a causal relationship between a substance and effects on health or the environment; then the problems
of demonstrating a causal incident of harm, prevention of which is the regulatory goal. Health sur-
veys are extremely complex and costly enterprises. Some progress is being made, of course. See,
e.g., 12 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 677 (Oct. 2, 1981) (reporting a recent EPA staff study, based on a health
interview survey of 50,000 households, which indicates a statistically significant relationship be-
tween total suspended particulate (TSP) emission levels and workdays lost). Still, benefits analysis is
fraught with uncertainties that require the analyst to rely heavily on assumptions every step of the
way. The results are bound to reflect such value judgments.
30. 46Fed.Reg. 13,193(1981).
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for regulation remains, even if bureaucrats cannot quantify every con-
ceivable cost and benefit.
Executive Order 12,291 contributes to less regulation in two ways: (I)
the regulatory impact analyses (RIA's) now required by the cost-benefit
justification process 31 stack the deck against regulation because benefits
are usually more difficult to quantify than are costs; and (2) the mandatory
review of proposed rules by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) required under the order32 inevitably allows those who wish to
fight regulation-industry, administration budget-cutters, etc.-an extra
opportunity to kill or weaken a rule.
1. Regulatot3
, 
Inpact Analyses
Section 2 of Executive Order 12,291 sets the general standard by which
all regulations in the Executive Branch agencies shall be judged "to the
extent permitted by law.' 33 It requires, inter alia, that no regulatory ac-
tion be undertaken unless its potential benefits to society outweigh its po-
tential costs, and that "[a]mong alternative approaches to any given regu-
latory objective, the alternative involving the least net cost to society shall
be chosen." 34
Any "major" rule-defined in a way that highlights potential
costs35-must be subjected to an RIA before it is proposed as well as
before it is published as a final rule. 36 Both of these RIA's must be pre-
pared in accordance with the general standards of section 2, which put the
burden on the agency to justify a proposed rule's anticipated costs, by
finding that they are outweighed by its anticipated benefits. 37
The OMB's guidance to agencies on how to prepare RIA's 38 adds to
the agencies' burden of justifying regulatory initiatives. Each RIA should
begin with a "statement of need for and consequences of" 39 the rule. An
agency is to address several issues, including whether, "[s]ince regula-
tory failure may be a real possibility, is it clear that the proposed regula-
tion would produce better results than no regulatory change[.] '40 Among
the "alternative approaches" an agency should consider, according to the
31. Id. at 13,194.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 13,193.
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 13,194.
37. Id. at 13,193.
38. OMB Interim Guidance to Federal Agencies on Preparing Cost-Benefit Analysis of Regula-
tions. reprinted in 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 258-59 (June 19, 1981).
39. Id. at 258.
40. Id.
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OMB, are "[t]he consequences of having no regulation. . . . For ex-
ample, RIAs for health and safety regulations should consider the ade-
quacy of tort law or state programs such as workmen's compensation.' '41
The RIA process under the Executive Order appears deliberately struc-
tured to predispose the policy-maker to reach an anti-regulatory conclu-
sion. In fact, that tendency is inherent in any cost-benefit analysis process
that, rather than operating simply as a means of narrowing the issues for
ultimate policy judgment, becomes an end in itself. Furthermore, a cost-
benefit analysis is not the scientific, value-neutral method it is often
claimed to be. Many problems, such as what assumptions should be made
about likely compliance behavior, arise in the process of performing a
cost-benefit analysis which in effect require the policy-makers to rely,
consciously or not, on their own value system. To the extent that agency
policy-makers share anti-regulatory values, the regulatory process will be
biased against regulation, even without the OMB directives. 42
In addition, the cost side of the cost-benefit equation almost invariably
receives greater weight in the process of cost-benefit analysis. This is so
for two reasons: (1) costs are generally much easier to quantify than are
benefits; and (2) decision-makers find it easier to focus on considerations
that have been quantified. 43 Thus, ironically, if cost-benefit analysis is
used as the single standard by which a regulation is to stand or fall, it
undermines the original premise for government regulation. The political
system intervenes in the marketplace through regulation because the eco-
nomic system does not provide, or provides imperfectly, benefits or
"goods" valued by society such as the prevention or mitigation of envi-
ronmental harm. Yet, if overemphasized, cost-benefit analysis requires
essentially a return to the marketplace with its emphasis on costs and a
strictly economic mode of decision-making: 44 approaches rejected by
Congress in its underlying decision to regulate.
The effort is misguided. In those regulatory areas dependent on scien-
tific research, such as controlling exposure to chemicals, regulatory pol-
icy decisions must inevitably be based on less than perfect information
and therefore on the policy-maker's expert judgment. If a policy decision
within the framework of a regulatory statute has to be fully substantiated
41. Id.
42. See CENTER FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES AT THE MASSACHUSETrS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
prepared for the SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D SEss., BENEFITS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION 14-16 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as
REGULATORY BENEFITS].
43. Id. at 19.
44. See id. at 17.
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by strictly demonstrated economic benefits, much of the regulation con-
templated by that statute would be halted. 45
Moreover, the benefits realized by avoiding or blunting damage costs
are notoriously difficult to quantify. One report has noted:
Health-related hazards involve a larger component of intangible costs
than other situations. This gives rise to the need to account for such costs as
pain and suffering, emotional stress, and the loss associated with bereave-
ment. In addition, estimating the value of environmental amenities (such as
the preservation of wildlife) poses a variety of difficult conceptual and em-
pirical problems. Traditional valuation analyses typically neglect or under-
state the benefits of regulation in these areas. 46
Most cost-benefit analyses have completely ignored the potential indirect
benefits of regulation:
Indirect, or leveraged, benefits accrue from the very presence of a particular
regulation which induces industry to control unregulated hazards in antici-
pation of regulation, to innovate, and to find ways to meet the public's need
for a cleaner, healthier environment while maintaining industrial capacity.
The long-term, positive side effects accompanying a regulation need to be
included in a complete assessment of the benefits of a regulatory strategy.
An example of leveraging is the fact that chemical companies are now rou-
tinely conducting short-term tests on new chemicals for possible carci-
nogenic activity, even though specific regulatory requirements under the
Toxic Substances Control Act have not been promulgated. These long-term
benefits are substantial, though difficult to quantify. Their exclusion omits
from estimates of benefits what may be the largest contribution of regula-
tion .47
Indeed, the OMB's RIA Guidance to agencies urges them to include
"various [indirect] adverse effects of the regulation-such as those from
reductions in competition, innovative activity, or productivity growth" 48
but fails even to mention analogous indirect benefits of regulation that
agencies should consider. It is unnecessary to give a regulation's oppo-
nents this one-sided advantage. It is our collective thinking about regula-
tion's indirect benefits that needs stimulation, not the other way around.
45. If we adopted proposals that cause-and-effect data be required to be from studies on human
beings instead of animals, it would be at least a decade before we could provide sufficient substantia-
tion for many regulations. In fact, for some regulations-conceivably for many-we could never
supply such substantiation because of ethical constraints regarding human testing or because of prac-
tical limitations, e.g., the 100 + years it would take to trace potential genetic effects through several
human generations.
46. REGULATORY BENEFITS, supra note 42, at 17.
47. Id. at 19.
48. OMB Interim Guidance, supra note 38, at 259.
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This criticism of cost-benefit analysis is not intended to be wholesale.
Cost-benefit analysis, if it is used with a full recognition of its limitations
and with a healthy skepticism concerning its results, is a valuable means
for organizing data so that the policy-maker may determine which regula-
tory alternative is most cost-effective in a broader sense. The problem
with the cost-benefit justification approach to regulatory reform is that it
tends to make regulatory costs and benefits the only subjects of inquiry.
There are other important standards by which a regulation should also be
judged. Two such criteria are the legislative mandate-the likelihood that
the regulation will realize the benefits that Congress and society expected
when regulatory authority was delegated to the agency-and the likeli-
hood of compliance with the regulation. 49
2. OMB Review
These substantive issues also raise the political question of who makes
the decision. The real debate here is not the right of a President to inter-
vene and affect the outcome of rulemaking. The real issue is what rules
apply to the President, and, more practically, to the vast apparatus of the
modem Presidency; and the concern is the undue extent to which this
apparatus is able to "coordinate" and "influence" proposed regulations
in secret, thereby remaining largely unaccountable to Congress, the pub-
lic, or the courts. The reality is that well-financed special interests have
an inordinately greater ability to influence rulemaking through the White
House than through regular agency processes. The opportunities for back-
door decision-making abound under Executive Order 12,291. That order
chills regulatory activities, not only by its cost-benefit analysis require-
ments, but also through its procedural provisions for OMB review, prior
to publication, of all proposed and final rules. For major rules, the OMB
review causes delay of at least ninety days beyond the time necessary for
the agency's own development and review of a rule.50 Conceivably, the
review taking place during this delay could yield better, rather
A-
49. See REGULATORY BENEFTTs, supra note 42, at 16. These criteria are explored further in Part II
of this article.
50. Proposed major rules must be sent to OMB at least 60 days before publication, final major
rules at least 30 days before publication; non-major proposed and final rules must be sent to OMB at
least 10 days before publication. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 3(c)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,194 (1981).
The Executive Order sets no time limit on OMB's review at either stage. To the contrary, it implicitly
permits OMB to take as long as it likes to complete its review, except to the extent that that may be
inconsistent with an agency's "responsibilities delegated by law." See id. § 3(f). Since agencies
generally get at least some judicial extension of statutory deadlines relatively easily, this constraint
may not be very serious.
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than less, regulation. Political realities, however, combined with these
formal requirements, have produced the anti-regulatory results of "regu-
latory relief."
The extra layer of policy-making review by the OMB at the pre-pro-
posed and pre-final rulemaking stages can give special interests an extra
inning. As a practical matter, if opponents of a regulation have struck out
at the agency, they then turn to the OMB, hoping that that agency will
take a fresh look at the matter. Moreover, much of the OMB's review-
especially during the crucial preproposal stage-takes place off the pub-
lic record. As a result, this review is more vulnerable to special interest
advocacy than are public proceedings before an agency. This is true not
only because all parties may not have access to the OMB, but also be-
cause the OMB staff conducting the review does not have the substantive
expertise in a regulatory area that would enable it to reassess thoroughly
the merits of a presentation.
In short, the OMB's review process is much more significant politi-
cally for its potential veto or manipulation of policy than for its certain
delay.
Drastically reduced agency budgets, especially at the EPA, are another
aspect of political reality that turn Executive Order 12,291 into an anti-
regulatory instrument. A thorough analysis of a proposed rule's antici-
pated costs and benefits is usually very costly. Under President Carter's
Executive Order 12,044, 51 which imposed less extensive cost-benefit
analysis requirements than President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291,
the EPA spent anywhere from $33,000 to $1.2 million to perform indi-
vidual regulatory analyses. 52 There simply are not enough resources in an
agency budget that would be reduced forty percent 53 to perform adequate
RIA's for regulations mandated by statute. This Administration's require-
ment of detailed cost-benefit justification analyses, combined with its
substantial cuts in Agency resources for performing the analyses, is cer-
tainly one of the reasons why the EPA's rulemaking activity has de-
creased roughly four-fold since the last year of the Carter Administra-
51. 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
52. Regulatory Reform Act, 1981: Hearings on S. 1080 Before the Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Affairs. 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) (statement of Milton Socolar, Acting Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States), at 4, app. at 3. Not only are the EPA's RIA costs under E.O. 12,291
probably higher, but OMB's review of a rule and the accompanying RIA also imposes some costs.
See id. app. at 6. Thus the fact that OMB's resources are also limited is an additional factor contribu-
ting to delay in the regulatory process and, at least indirectly, to a decrease in rulemaking activity.
53. The EPA budget would be reduced from $1.353 billion in fiscal 1981 to $817 million in real
1981 purchasing power under EPA Administrator Anne M. Gorsuch's proposed budget for fiscal
1983. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, SHREDDING THE ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY NET: THE FULL
STORY BEHIND THE EPA BUDGET CUTS 9 (1982).
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tion.54 Perhaps even more significant are the budget constraints imposed
on the EPA's Office of Research and Development. EPA Administrator
Anne M. Gorsuch's proposed fiscal 1983 budget for this office is ex-
pected to be only $206 million, down from $365.5 million in fiscal
1981. 55 As basic research winds down, the Agency may be unable to
produce sufficient data to support new regulations, even under require-
ments less exacting than the Executive Order's RIA requirements.
The present-emphasis on strict cost-benefit justification for regulation
prejudices the regulatory policy-making process against regulation. This
anti-regulatory approach results from misapprehension of both the under-
lying need for and the inevitability of regulation. Our environmental
problems stem less often from any intent by industry to pollute, than
"from inadvertence, unawareness, random information gathering tech-
niques, and from the difficulty of keeping pace with the advancement of
technology.' '56 The benefits of regulation sought by the public are either
intangible or can be stated primarily only as negatives: the prevention or
mitigation of substantial harm to human health and to the environment.
On the other side of the equation, the alleged costs of regulation are often
magnified. The result, under the cost-benefit justification approach, is ei-
ther no regulation or poor regulation, or (amounting to the same thing) a
decision-making process that is so slow or changeable that neither the
public nor industry knows what standards govern.
III. EFFECTIVE REGULATION: GETTING THE JOB DONE
Regulatory reform efforts must focus on how to make regulation effec-
tive, that is, how to effectuate the legislative mandate at the least cost.
The constant inquiry should be whether a particular alternative will be
likely to result in compliance that will achieve the regulatory intent. Thus
the important characteristics of effective regulation should include the
following three elements:
Clarity and certainty. The standards to which regulated behavior is ex-
pected to conform should be public, explicit, and consistent with other
related standards. Not only must the regulations themselves be clear and
certain, but the agency must support its regulations with clear and certain
enforcement policies. Unless regulations and their enforcement are clear
and certain, business is highly unlikely to achieve the social goals in-
54. EPA's First Year Under Reagan Marked by Friction with Congress, Criticism Over Budget,
New Direction, 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1272, 1274 (Jan. 29, 1982).
55. Id. at 1275.
56. T.H. TRurrr, D.R. BERz, D.W. WEINBERG, J.B. MOLLOY, ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT HAND-
BOOK: BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AUDITING iii (1981).
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tended by the regulation. Moreover, even those achievements that are
made may otherwise be only at a higher than necessary cost. Other things
being equal, the most clear and certain regulation is most likely to elicit
compliance.
Reasonableness and fairness. Those affected by regulation, especially
officers and employees responsible for conceiving and implementing cor-
porate policy, must perceive regulation to be reasonable and fair in terms
of the demands it places on corporate resources. 57 Again, the consistency
with which regulatory requirements are enforced is important. Other
things being equal, the regulation that is perceived as most reasonable and
fair is most likely to elicit compliance.
Efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Efficient regulation is cost-effective
regulation, that is, that which is analytically determined to be the least
costly way, within statutory constraints, to achieve the legislative man-
date. Other things being equal, the most cost-effective regulation is most
likely to elicit compliance.
Each of these three characteristics contributes to the likely effective-
ness of a regulation. In addition to weighing these factors, though, the
regulatory policy-maker should explicitly inquire into effectiveness per
se. Determination of the likely per se effectiveness of a regulation re-
quires a different kind of judgment-one informed by an accurate under-
standing of corporate behavior, especially corporate decision-making
structures and patterns of communication, and of financial incentives that
can be manipulated to stimulate corporate self-interest in compliance.
The question here is whether the entities subject to the regulation are
likely to comply with it in a way that will achieve regulatory intent. More
often than not, if industry can be persuaded that compliance with a regu-
lation will be profitable to it (or at least more profitable than no or partial
compliance), the regulation will be effective.
Clarity, certainty, reasonableness, fairness, efficiency, and effective-
ness are all valid and necessary considerations in devising regulatory
schemes. The following examples of innovative regulatory techniques in
the environmental field appear to offer some of those advantages. They
are discussed here as illustrations of how regulatory reform might get the
job done.
57. Such "'demands" may be in terms of innovation and technological advance: a regulation may
be technology-forcing and still meet this test. The mere absence of an inexpensive, ready-to-hand
mechanism does not in itself invalidate a regulatory requirement. although such absences may require
allowances in time frames or other types of credit for necessary innovations.
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A. Example 1-Mandatory Third-Party Liability Insurance
In December 1978, the EPA proposed regulations under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act 58 that would have required new hazard-
ous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities to demonstrate "fi-
nancial responsibility" for claims of a minimum specified dollar amount
for personal injury or property damage arising from escape of hazardous
waste during the facility's operating life. 59 Under this initial proposal,
financial responsibility could have been established by evidence of insur-
ance, self-insurance (defined as a percentage of the firm's equity), some
combination of the two, or some other form of financial responsibility
acceptable to the Regional Administrator. 60
When the EPA promulgated these regulations in interim final form in
January 1981,6 1 it had made several changes. The interim regulations
eliminated the options of self-insurance and a Regional Administrator-
devised variance. They also required both new and existing firms manag-
ing hazardous waste to purchase liability insurance. However, facilities
where hazardous waste does not come in contact with the land were not
required to purchase coverage for non-sudden occurrences; and for facili-
ties required to purchase such coverage-landfills, surface impound-
ments, and land treatment facilities-the requirement was to be phased in
over a three-year period, beginning with larger firms.
This evolution in policy was primarily due to the Agency's intelligence
from the insurance industry that policies covering non-sudden occur-
rences were already on the market, though to a limited extent, and thus
were available to hazardous waste firms or would become available with
encouragement from the EPA.62 Moreover, even if the established insur-
ance industry did not come forward with adequate coverage, the hazar-
dous waste firms required to have the coverage could form their own mu-
tual insurance carriers. 63 In addition, and this is a key point,
commentators had observed and the Agency had agreed that requiring ex-
isting firms to obtain liability coverage would put the insurance carriers in
the position of having to evaluate those existing hazardous waste firms in
an effort to assure their compliance with environmentally sound practices
as a condition to obtaining insurance.
58. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
59. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946, 59,006 (1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 250.43-9).
60. 43 Fed. Reg. at 58,987.
61. 46 Fed. Reg. 2802 (1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 264, 265).
62., 46 Fed. Reg. 2802, 2827 (1981).
63. Meyer, Compensating Hazardous Waste Victims: RCRA Insurance Regulations and a Not So
"Super"Fund Act, 11 ENVrL. L. 689, 708 n. 105 (1981).
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The status of the EPA's third-party liability hazardous waste regula-
tions became problematical, however, when the Agency announced in
October 1981 that it was deferring their effective date to April 13, 1982 in
order to consider whether to withdraw the liability requirements en-
tirely. 64 Recently, the EPA changed its mind and published revised in-
terim final rules requiring liability insurance. 65 But, because some por-
tions of the rules may be subject to continuing controversy before the
Agency and, perhaps, in litigation, their ultimate form cannot be fore-
seen. In any event, required insurance coverage has been thought by
many to be a potentially valuable means of mitigating environmental
harm because it makes environmental compliance profitable: those com-
panies whose operations are environmentally sound will be charged less
for the required coverage than companies whose operations pose environ-
mental risks.
On the other hand, the insurance industry views its role, more realisti-
cally, as that of spreading-not preventing-risk. Yet the technique of
requiring, in the regulation of hazardous wastes, that waste-disposal firms
maintain third-party liability insurance merits serious consideration for
several reasons. First, it guarantees that there will be at least some com-
pensation to victims of environmental harm, providing they can prove
liability. 66 It also enlists the insurance industry in a complementary role
with the government. 67 As a result, it promises to improve both perfor-
mance and the risk-assessment approach to regulation. The insurance pre-
mium charged would presumably be based both on an engineering study
of a site and on risk-assessment techniques. This kind of regulation can be
tailored to particular facilities and thus can be clear, certain, reasonable,
and fair.
Second, this technique creates a strong financial incentive for compli-
ance, not only with environmental regulations but also with general prin-
ciples of responsible financial management. If we assume that the pre-
mium is a function of the amount of risk that a particular facility poses to
human health and the environment, then that dollar figure is an immedi-
ate, rational representation of the cost of the risk of harm to the regulated
company. Conversely, it is a monetary measure of the potential benefits
to the company of adopting environmentally sound corporate behavior,
including compliance with applicable regulations. Corporate managers
are more likely to change corporate behavior in response to this
64. 46 Fed. Reg. 48,197 (1981 ).
65. 47 Fed. Reg. 16,544 (1982).
66. Meyer. supra note 63. at 711.
67. See id. at 711 & nn. 118. 119 (giving examples of precedents to statutorily-required insur-
ance).
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financial signal than they are likely to speculate about such uncertainties
as whether an agency has sufficient resources to inspect for and proceed
against violations, whether incidents of environmental harm will occur,
and whether an injured party can obtain a judgment for such an incident.
This kind of regulation translates the costs of noncompliance and the ben-
efits of compliance into commonly-used balance-sheet terms. It is there-
fore likely to be effective in eliciting corporate compliance to get the job
done.
Third, requiring third-party liability coverage involves top manage-
ment directly in the process of environmental compliance by making it an
element in the management of finances and risk. As a result, compliance
is more likely to be sought as a corporate policy goal than if it were
merely one of many subordinate concerns for a plant manager, whose
focus is necessarily on daily operative performance.
Finally, the technique places on the regulated industry a share of the
enforcement costs of the regulatory process, or at least the portion of
those costs administered by the insurance industry. The EPA and parallel
state agencies lack sufficient resources to station a "cop" at every facil-
ity. The insurance industry, though it legitimately perceives its role as
that of spreading rather than preventing risk, would probably stimulate
compliance through the performance requirements it would impose as a
condition of coverage. Profit maximization behavior in the insurance in-
dustry and in the regulated hazardous-waste firms would lead to cost-ef-
fective regulatory techniques.
A significant potential disadvantage of regulation by mandatory insur-
ance coverage is the due process problems that might arise when a carrier
wants to cancel a policy. The private insurance industry is not bound by
the administrative protections, for example the need to show cause and to
provide a hearing, that government agencies, under the Constitution and
statutes, must provide. 68 Nevertheless, the potential advantages of this
supplement to regulation are so substantial that it deserves serious consid-
eration.
B. Example 2-Corporate Environmental Auditing
A corporate environmental audit is a review by a corporation of its ac-
tivities affecting the environment to determine whether it is in compliance
with federal, state, and local environmental laws and regulations. Many
United States corporations began to conduct environmental audits in the
mid-1970's, partially as a result of congressional and judicial pressures
68. Meyer, supra note 63, at 711.
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and consent orders issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission to
enforce its disclosure requirements. 69
While some firms initiated auditing in response to such external pres-
sures, in many others the practice has been entirely voluntary. A good
auditing program depends on management's recognition that the com-
pany's ability to function profitably requires prudent management of ac-
tivities that affect its financial exposure, including environmental compli-
ance. Some corporations have established their own environmental
auditing departments and conduct these audits in-house; others hire out-
side consultants who have developed a recognized expertise in the field.
In either situation, it is generally recognized by management, environ-
mental auditors, and legal counsel that, to be of service to the company,
the audit function must be performed by persons who: (1) are not them-
selves responsible for compliance with environmental requirements; and
(2) have direct access to and the support of the company's chief executive
officer. 70
Several years ago, the EPA began to generate ideas about regulatory
programs that would stimulate environmental auditing. The Agency cur-
rently appears to be making progress toward designing such a program.
Some of its possible features are outlined below. 7'
First, the EPA would develop general guidance criteria for an accept-
able corporate environmental audit program. This should be done in con-
sultation with the states, because many federal environmental require-
ments are administered and enforced by state agencies (with direct
enforcement by the EPA only if the state defaults). This development
should be done, of course, with public notice and comment. Among the
general criteria that the EPA has considered for such guidance are: (I) the
company's audit program should have the corporate executive officer's
clear support; (2) the audit should be conducted by independent persons,
whether company employees or outside consultants, who are not respon-
sible for production and who are rewarded on the basis of the company's
environmental performance; (3) the company should establish regular
procedures of ensuring that any violations uncovered by the audit are cor-
rected at the plant level; (4) the company should employ an established
schedule of site visits or internal inspections by the auditing team; and (5)
the company should establish a regular procedure for communicating the
69. See Harrison, Big Business's Pollution Problems Spawn a New Breed of Auditors, N.Y.
Times. May 17, 1981, § 3, at 8, col. I.
70. Id.; see New Environmental Audit Plan: Staff Adds Flexibilit.v, Keeps Inspections, Inside
E.P.A., Feb. 12, 1982, at 1,2.
71. This description of a possible EPA environmental auditing program is drawn from recent
conversations with EPA staff, as well as from New Environmental Audit Plan: StaffAdds Flexibility,
Keeps Inspections, supra note 70.
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information about compliance above the plant level to corporate head-
quarters. In addition, companies should be required to establish a proce-
dure for retaining records of each audit.
In order to get approval for a company's audit program, the EPA may
require that a corporate executive officer certify to responsible federal or
state authorities that an audit program meeting the above criteria is in
place. The certifying officer should be someone with ultimate responsibil-
ity for the corporation's environmental compliance, and should be of at
least vice-presidential rank. In addition, false certification should subject
the individual to personal liability. After the EPA receives the certifica-
tion, the Agency should be required to approve or reject the company's
audit program within a reasonable defined period-say, 120 days.
The EPA is structuring its regulatory audit policy to offer companies
some inducements to adopt internal auditing programs. First, in return for
requiring companies to notify the state or EPA's Regional Administrator
of violations found during the audit, enforcement penalties could be
waived provided that the company acts in good faith to bring itself into
compliance. Statutory constraints, such as mandatory fines for violations,
would have to be modified to make such self-reporting provisions viable.
Second, the EPA could eliminate many reporting requirements, so long
as the company has procedures for retaining its own auditing records.
Third, the EPA is considering reducing, but not eliminating, its own in-
spections or inspections by state agencies of companies whose audit pro-
grams meet the criteria that would be established. If an auditing policy
works, it should soon become evident to the EPA and the states that com-
panies that meet the criteria are usually in compliance and, as a result, the
need for frequent inspections should substantially decrease. Any audit
program, however, must ultimately be judged by whether "compliance"
is actually achieved.
This sort of flexible policy (really a strategy) for encouraging environ-
mental auditing deserves serious consideration. Its potential advantages
are numerous. The principal advantage is that, if the EPA structures the
policy to make it profitable to companies, 72 private industry would be
encouraged to create automatic self-correcting mechanisms for dealing
with environmental problems when they occur. Rather than depending on
the uncertainties of a regulatory agency's inspection and enforcement ef-
forts to uncover and correct violations, environmental auditing, by en-
72. For example, the EPA could consult with the financial industry to find out what criteria it
might look for in determining the interest rate at which it would provide funds to a company with
hazardous waste facilities.
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couraging corporations to comply of their own volition, is likely to result
in more pervasive compliance with environmental regulations. 73
Of course there are risks to an environmental auditing policy. For the
public, there is the risk that companies that uncover violations will neither
report them nor correct them. Yet, given the Agency's discretion to con-
tinue to inspect; the availability of statutory citizen suit provisions; the
likelihood that auditing consultants will, in effect, "police" much of the
process; and the severe penalties that a certifying corporate officer could
personally incur if the company's audit program does not measure up to
the EPA criteria; the risk may be worth taking. For companies that insti-
tute environmental auditing programs in reliance upon an EPA policy, the
principal risk is that the violations they uncover and report and act in good
faith to correct will result in penalties despite the provision of penalty
waivers. This risk, too, seems worth running, for if the EPA were to seek
penalties in contravention of the policy, the whole policy would collapse
in the resulting negative reaction.
73. The EPA's current thinking is that it would not require an approved audit program to use
outside auditors. Environmental auditing can be done with the necessary independence by corporate
personnel. Nevertheless, as a practical matter many companies will probably turn to consultants at
least to design, if not to implement, their audit programs. See Harrison, supra note 69. The market
for such services will grow, and consulting firms that have already begun to develop a reputation for
setting up and performing good environmental auditing programs will benefit. Insofar as they will be
marketing their expertise and their good reputation with the EPA and state agencies, they would
assume something of the oversight role that we envision for insurance companies if third party liabil-
ity insurance were required under RCRA. This is especially true because of the potential liability to
them if they were to write an opinion letter to a company stating that it is in environmental compli-
ance when in fact it is not. With their necessarily cautious, "show-me" posture, auditing firms would
thus remove some of the regulatory burdens from the EPA. While the criteria that the EPA is consid-
ering for an approvable environmental auditing program currently lack specificity, that may be the
necessary price of the flexibility the EPA's concept offers. The current concept should be tested in a
pilot program; we understand that the EPA is considering conducting a trial auditing program in
Region V. In any event, a company that does develop an audit program that the EPA approves can
rely on that fact. Thus a degree of certainty would be provided. The non-specificity of the criteria in
the possible EPA guidance is also, of course, an advantage, for it allows corporate management to
tailor a program to fit a company's operations and flow of communications.
The EPA concept of waiving penalties for companies with approved audit programs offers a signif-
icant financial incentive for adopting an audit program acceptable to the EPA and for subsequently
acting in good faith to correct any violations the company might uncover through the audit. However,
significant exposure would remain, for example, to private litigation, or to discovery during a hostile
take-over attempt. But there are also other potential financial incentives. For example, pollution con-
trol equipment is likely to be operated more efficiently if it is regularly inspected and maintained in
anticipation of audits. Companies with EPA-approved audit programs may be able to purchase liabil-
ity insurance (including any that may be mandatory under environmental regulations) more cheaply
than if they did not have such audit programs. Companies with such programs also may find it easier
to raise money in the capital markets. The EPA should solicit the views of the insurance and financial
industries before issuing a final environmental audit policy in order to structure it to stimulate private
sector financial incentives that complement any penalty-waiver feature the EPA can provide itself.
The more financial incentives that can be built into the policy, the more likely it is that companies will
adopt audit programs.
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C. Other Examples
There are other examples of innovative regulatory techniques that use
financial incentives to elicit environmental compliance. One that has been
much discussed for years, and appears to have made substantial progress,
is the "bubble," or controlled emissions trading policy under which a
company is allowed to determine the mix of pollution controls at all its
stationary sources in an area, so long as the overall emissions levels from
all those facilities are in compliance with applicable laws and regula-
tions.74 The bubble policy encourages industry's capacity for technologi-
cal innovation to meet a performance standard; it thus relies on the carrot
of lower operating costs as distinct from the stick df regulatory sanctions
to be applied if complex, rigid design standards are not followed. Similar
emissions trading policies could be used in motor vehicle pollution con-
trol, by averaging the emissions of a manufacturer's entire fleet to deter-
mine compliance, and in water pollution control as well as in stationary
source air quality regulation. The creation of marketable rights, for exam-
ple by auctioning limited airport takeoff and landing slots to reduce noise
pollution or by allowing sources to "bank" and trade credits for emission
reductions, is another innovative regulatory technique that has already be-
gun to be implemented. Emission fees, which are charges based on pollu-
tant emission levels, also are a technique that would provide financial
incentives both to reduce pollution and to develop least costly control
technologies. 75 Using the tax code to encourage technological innovation
in pollution-control equipment and processes should also be explored.
IV. CONCLUSION
Regulation should try to achieve policy goals with fairness and effi-
ciency, and regulatory reform should try to orient regulatory processes
and policy-makers toward that objective. The conception and develop-
ment of innovative regulatory techniques that began well before the 1980
election was an attempt to find alternatives to the "command and con-
trol" regulation traditionally used by government, but which was by
then, in many instances, clearly outdated. This regulatory reform was an
effort to use market forces to achieve environmental goals with minimal
economic costs.
That effort should be renewed with the strengthened goal of structuring
74. See 47 Fed. Reg. 15,076 (1982) (emissions trading policy statement).
75. For these and other examples of innovative regulatory techniques, see U.S. REGULATOR '
COUNCIL, REGULATING WITH COMMON SENSE: A PROGRESS REPORT ON INNOVATIVE REGULATORY
TECHNIQUES (Oct. 1980).
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regulation to stimulate voluntary corporate compliance. The regulated
community will strive to realize society's environmental goals if the ben-
efits of achieving them can be made real in corporate terms to those re-
sponsible for corporate action.
